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Creating the Back Ward: The Triumph of Custodialism and
the Uses of Therapeutic Failure in Nineteenth Century Idiot
Asylums
Philip M. Ferguson

Introduction
In December 1965, Burton Blatt, along with photographer Fred Kaplan, made a series of visits to
a variety of large public institutions for people with intellectual disabilities. They made special
efforts at each facility to visit the ‘back wards’ and document what they knew they would find.
The photographic exposé (Blatt and Kaplan 1966/1974) of the abuse and neglect that had
become standard “treatment” in these institutions helped stoke the fires of outrage and shame
among both politicians and the public, leading to the large-scale movement of the people forced
to live in these conditions back to the community. The population of these large, public
institutions peaked in 1967 at about 230,000 individuals and has continued to decline to a current
population just under 30,000 (Larson et al. 2013, 7).
Blatt and Kaplan undertook their efforts, in part, to document the conditions that had
outraged then Senator Robert Kennedy when he had visited some of the institutions in New York
a few months earlier. Blatt wanted to assure everyone that what the Senator had witnessed was
the rule, not the exception, in the incarceration of people with intellectual disabilities in 1965.
One did not have to know how the situation had devolved to such a state to recognize the horror
of what had come to be.
It is true that a short visit to the back wards of an institution for the mentally retarded will
not provide, even for the most astute observer, any clear notion of the antecedents of the
problems observed, the complexities of dealing with them, or ways to correct them. We
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can believe that the Senator did not fully comprehend the subtleties, the tenuous
relationships, the grossness of budgetary inequities, the long history of political
machinations, the extraordinary difficulty in providing care for severely mentally
retarded patients, the unavailability of highly trained leaders, and the near-impossibility
in recruiting dedicated attendants and ward personnel. But, we know, as well as do
thousands of others who have been associated with institutions for the mentally retarded,
that what Senator Kennedy claimed to have seen he did see. In fact, we know personally
of few institutions for the mentally retarded in the United States completely free of dirt
and filth, odors, naked patients groveling in their own feces, children in locked cells,
horribly crowded dormitories, and understaffed and wrongly staffed facilities. (Blatt
1974, v)
It has been almost a half-century since Blatt’s observations of Christmas in Purgatory.
Over the intervening years, we have become somewhat inured to the abuses of that earlier era. If
conditions in the institutions that remain open are far from perfect, society seems to trust that the
grossest of the conditions have been rectified. Yet people in North America remain familiar with
the meaning of the term “back ward.” The “back wards” 1 are where the worst abuses happened.
Both in fact and in symbol, the back wards of institutions were those out-of-sight hellholes where
the inmates with the most significant disabilities, the most challenging behaviors, the most
hopeless of prognoses were abandoned. If back wards still exist then surely they are the
exception rather than the rule. At least that is the hope. However, whether actual back wards still
exist or not, metaphorical “back wards” still surely do.
My focus in this chapter is on the origin of the back ward rather than its demise. Where
did the “back wards” that Blatt and Kennedy witnessed come from in the first place? What
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exactly were those “antecedents of the problems observed” that Blatt cited? This chapter reviews
that history and argues that, in fact, there is a specific narrative to the evolution of the
institutional “back ward” as an identifiable place where people with the most significant
intellectual disabilities were to be incarcerated and largely forgotten.
As a physical location, institutional back wards in North America were created in the last
half of the nineteenth century. This is not to say that there was no abuse or neglect before that
time. Of course there was. Indeed, it was the documentation of existing abuses in county poor
houses that was the ostensible justification for the creation of new, state institutions built along a
new architectural and administrative model that included separate “wards” or “cottages” located
at the back of the institutional grounds. However, actual wards or units located at the back of
institutional settings were arrangements that American institutions borrowed from European
institutions as an administrative solution to a problem of managing an increasingly custodial
population. The so-called cottage plan for institutions allowed the creation of ever larger,
congregate facilities where separate, individual units were built to house specific types and levels
of inmates, with the most custodial classifications assigned to those units the furthest away from
the administration building.
Especially in New York State, the debate over the “cottage plan” was both contentious
and extended. Exploring that debate and how it evolved from roughly 1860 to 1915 allows a
more detailed understanding of the power of the back ward as both symbol and artifact of
institutional incarceration of people with the most significant intellectual disabilities. It leads to a
series of additional questions that are specific to New York, but suggestive of larger institutional
models throughout North America. Why were the details of institutional provisions for those
individuals judged to be hopelessly idiotic or at least unimprovably demented or imbecilic so
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persistently contested in New York State and elsewhere? An adequate response to that question
must quickly move beyond the specific issues and personalities to a larger question about the
uses and abuses of the concept of “therapeutic failure” in the professionalization of care for
people with intellectual disabilities in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. 2
The creation of the back ward, then, becomes the story of the move from care to custody
to incarceration. After reviewing the key points of this story, I argue that the details of
developmental classification and institutional organization underlying the debate over custodial
care reveal the beginnings of a model of service (a so-called continuum of care) for people with
intellectual disabilities that still dominates today despite the diminishing role of the residential
institution.

Locating Custody: The Debate over Separate or Congregate Care
In December 1906, some 60 years before Blatt’s exposé, there were four state institutions in New
York specifically charged with the care and treatment of feebleminded 3 individuals. The names
of the facilities were straightforward indications of their official purpose upon creation:
1.

The Syracuse State School for Feeble-Minded Children (established 1852);

2.

The State Custodial Asylum for Feeble-Minded Women (est. at Newark, 1878);

3.

The Rome State Custodial Asylum (est. 1894);

4.

The Craig Colony for Epileptics (est. at Sonyea, 1896)

The Syracuse facility—the second oldest public institution in the United States to focus
specifically on the so-called feebleminded population—was the only one of the four to mention
“school” and “children” in its name. This was suggestive of the facility’s official emphasis on the
remediation—and even cure—of youth with mild or moderate intellectual disabilities, with a
projected return of many of its residents to life in the community as productive, if supervised,
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young adults. The Rome and Newark facilities, by contrast, are identified as “asylums” not
“schools,” and the official function of incarceration in these asylums was “custodial” in nature
rather than curative or even ameliorative. The Craig Colony4 facility clearly indicated its focus
on individuals with epilepsy. For most institutional professionals of this era, epilepsy was, if
anything, an even more dismal diagnosis than idiocy. Indeed, with some exceptions, epilepsy
was often treated as a particularly hopeless category of feeblemindedness. According to one
estimate, up to 98 percent of Craig’s inmates were judged to be feebleminded (Hebberd 1912). In
sum, two of the four “idiot asylums” in New York State at the dawn of the twentieth century
were explicitly custodial in origin and purpose, and a third was implicitly custodial given the
general view of incurability attributed to epilepsy.
It is, therefore, somewhat surprising to read in the Annual Report for the New York State
Board of Charities how a special committee had set out in that same month of December 1906, to
meet with the superintendents of the four asylums to discuss the very issue their institutions were
designed to solve: what to do with the so-called custodial inmates that threatened to overwhelm
the management of those custodial institutions? The summary of the meeting described the
institution leaders as “greatly embarrassed” by the growing number of inmates “so demented as
to be no longer capable of improvement, and to require, in the future, only custodial care” (New
York State Board of Charities 1907, 24). The custodial asylums, in short, were seemingly
ashamed that so many of their residents were, in fact, custodial. It had been at the behest of H. B.
Wilbur, the first superintendent of the Syracuse State School, and others (especially Josephine
Shaw Lowell 5) that the Newark asylum had originally been established in 1878. Almost 20 years
later, the creation of the institutions at Rome and Sonyea (Craig), New York, were likewise, in
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specific response to the complaint that the unimprovable inmates at Syracuse (and the county
poorhouses) were crowding out the educational focus that was the prime mission of the facility.
If it was a familiar problem, the recommended solution coming out of the meeting also
seemed strikingly repetitive, namely that the state should create another custodial asylum.
However, the recommendation to create another asylum was not necessarily—or at least not
primarily—to build the state’s institutional capacity to handle larger and larger numbers of
custodial inmates being admitted from the community. It was instead, to relieve the burden
placed on the existing institutions by the custodial inmates already in residence.
After consideration of the various phases of the problem, the superintendents and
managers present adopted unanimously a resolution recommending the establishment of a
new custodial asylum, to which may be sent all inmates of the four existing institutions
intended for epileptics and the feeble-minded, who are no longer proper subjects for
treatment and maintenance therein. (New York State Board of Charities 1907, 24)
The question arises as to why the administrators of asylums that had already been established as
custodial in nature (as was true of three of the four New York facilities) were so adamant in their
insistence that a new custodial asylum was needed? There were certainly social concerns about
the dangers of the umimprovable classes to the safety of morals of the general public. However,
in this situation the superintendents were discussing where, not whether, to incarcerate
individuals. The people in question were already in custody. There were also certainly concerns
of economics and efficiency. Getting rid of those inmates who were physically or cognitively
unable to contribute to their own care could be a significant cost savings. However, economic
concerns alone do not explain why the superintendents would be “greatly embarrassed” by
discovering that their institutions had precisely the individuals for whom their facilities had been
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intended. Instead, their apprehension seems at least partly grounded in a concern with
professional legitimacy and therapeutic skill. Regardless of the original purpose of the custodial
facilities, once in charge of such a place, the superintendents were just as vulnerable to the
professional need to demonstrate special expertise and discernment in the treatment of their
residents. One of the by-products of this demonstration was the ability to make classificational
distinctions where none had been made before. So, just as the almshouse managers had in earlier
eras felt it necessary to sort the economic failures into separate subgroups of able-bodied poor
and truly dependent; just as the insane asylum superintendents insisted on distinguishing the
curable insane from the chronic; so did the idiot asylum leaders find it important to distinguish
the truly custodial from those who could be somewhat useful and amenable to improvement. 6
Regardless of its origins or merits, the recommendation of the State Board of Charities to
create a new custodial asylum was not immediately acted upon by the state legislature. It was not
until some five years later (1911) that Letchworth Village was opened in downstate New York.
More importantly, when opened, Letchworth was designated to receive individuals at all levels
of functioning. It was to follow the pattern of congregate care adopted by virtually every other
state and model itself as one of the all-purpose “villages of the simple” (Kerlin 1885, 174).
Letchworth, in short, was both custodial and curative in official function. Despite the arguments
of institution superintendents and State Board of Charities leaders, New York ended up
following the rest of the country creating a network of idiot asylums across the state that were
meant to “serve” all of those with any level of feeblemindedness. Asylums, in essence, were to
create a continuum of care where separate cottages housed individuals with separate levels of
support needs, while still connected organizationally under one administration. Instead of
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creating one or two institutions that were all “back wards,” while others would supposedly have
none, New York joined the other states in creating room for back wards at every institution.

The Move to Congregate Care
Interestingly, the last half of the nineteenth century was taken up with earlier versions of the
same debate that the New York State Board of Charities was still considering in 1906. The
earlier debates sometimes dealt with different sets of particular issues (e.g., economics, treatment
regimens, prospects of cure or remediation, social welfare, ethical obligations). For a period of
years, the arguments became bitter and personal. Yet they always revolved around a singular
issue: what should be done with the growing number of individuals whose conditions remained
impervious to professional help? Many of the details of this debate have already been ably
recounted in histories of insane asylums (Dwyer 1987; Grob 1973; Schneider and Deutsch 1941;
Tomes 1984), or as part of the story of the rise of idiot asylums in the last half of the nineteenth
century (Ferguson 1992; Scheerenberger 1983; Trent 1994). However, it is useful to review the
broad outlines of the debate as it initially took shape.
In the 1860s and 1870s, the questions being raised were mainly about what were
increasingly referred to as the “chronically” or “incurably insane.” At both a political and a
professional level, this was a question of the centralization of state control and professional
responsibility for chronic—and usually poor insane. The issue was the financial burden placed
on the counties to care for these people, and also that they were being housed in terrible
conditions in county poorhouses. In 1864, the New York State legislature authorized Dr.
Sylvester Willard, in essence, to replicate a study done some 20 years earlier by Dorothea Dix
and survey the conditions of the “insane poor” housed in the county poor houses across the state
(Schneider and Deutsch 1941; Willard 1865). As did Dix, Willard found conditions that were
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largely appalling. Willard argued that the state should assume responsibility and take this
growing segment of the almshouse population off the counties’ hands. 7 Among most institution
professionals, there was little opposition to the idea that the state needed to take over the care of
this population.
However, if the first question of this era—“who” should be responsible for the custody of
the incurably insane—was answered fairly quickly by the expanding role of the state, the next
question of “where” that responsibility should be carried out evoked a longer debate. Both within
New York—and then between New York officials and professionals in other states—the
question was now where to house this new population. Should existing asylums simply be
expanded with the full range of patients now accepted, going from those most amenable to
“cure”, or the so-called acute cases, to the most chronically disturbed patients destined to a
lifetime of custody with little hope for cure (Dwyer 1987)? Or, should asylums be specialized to
serve a specific subset of patients so that acute and chronically ill patients would be housed in
separate asylums?
All of this played out from the late 1850s to the 1880s in reference to insane asylums.
However, it quickly became clear that New York’s path of creating totally separate asylums for
those of insane and feebleminded populations found to be beyond help would be the exception
rather than the rule. The other states, with a few variations, went quickly along the route of
congregate asylums with acute and chronic cases served by the same institution and residing in
separate cottages rather than creating entirely separate custodial institutions. The practical
implications of the so-called cottage plan were important. The move to multilevel congregate
care was greatly facilitated by a move away from the linear “Kirkbride model” of asylum
architecture to the “cottage” system of separate buildings arranged on a single campus with each
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building—or cottage—housing 40–60 individuals of a specific type and functional level (Tomes
1984). Even in New York, where the specialized asylum persisted, institutions would come to
follow this cottage design. It was cheaper, for one thing, to move away from the huge “bricks
and columns” edifices favored by Kirkbride and the first generation of asylum superintendents,
going instead to the simple, functional architecture of a basic two story box, duplicated multiple
times around a central administration building. Equally important, however, the architectural
move to separated buildings of simple design was inextricably bound in the policy decision to
move to congregate care. In essence, the cottage system of separate buildings allowed the “best
of both worlds”: a congregate facility housing all levels of inmates but comprising an array of
what could be characterized as separate mini-asylums in the form of cottages organized around
various categories of therapeutic success and failure.
Early on in the debate, the economic utility of the cottage plan was not the primary
rationale used by backers of this approach. Perhaps the most vocal opponent of the move to
create a separate insane asylum for the incurably insane was John Gray, who just happened to
also be the superintendent of what was at the time the only state insane asylum in New York,
based in the upstate city of Utica. Although his institution had from its beginning been focused
on “acute” cases—returning those who were deemed incurable to the county poorhouses—Gray
argued vociferously that it would be much better to make the Utica asylum an all purpose
institution, rather than create a separate custodial facility as called for by the Willard Report. In
the pages of the journal he edited, The American Journal of Insanity, Gray (as summarized by
Grob 1994, 108) outlined his reasons for preferring the congregate care model to the separate
asylum:
1.

Places like Utica couldn’t handle all of the acute cases;
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2.

Chronic cases still needed treatment;

3.

Separate asylums for incurables would become unwieldy;

4.

Absence of hope created an unhealthy atmosphere;

5.

Chronic patients affixed with stigma of pauperism;

6.

Families would resist putting their relatives in such places (i.e., asylums for
incurables). (On Separate Asylums for Curables and Incurables 1865)

Even after the New York State legislature passed the law in 1865 authorizing the creation
of the Willard Custodial Asylum, Gray could only imagine that it had been the result of
distracted politicians. In an unsigned article that he almost certainly authored, the misguided
action is explained:
It should be borne in mind, however, that the measure was adopted by the State
Government during a period of civil war, when the great question of the day absorbed
every thought; and that the time and occasion were unfavorable to calm investigation and
discussion of subjects of lesser moment. (On Separate Asylums 1865, 247)
Gray’s position was opposed by several other institution professionals (H. B. Wilbur,
George Cook, John Chapin) as well as members of the newly formed New York State Board of
Charities. In the years immediately after the Willard Report was released, the response to Gray’s
opposition to a separate custodial insane asylum was presented in the pages of the very journal
he edited. One of the main arguments was simply pointing to the failure of the Utica asylum to
serve the chronic population that it now professed to want (Cook 1866).
If one were to listen to what has been said in opposition to separate provision for the
chronic insane in the State of New York, having no knowledge of their actual condition,
he would suppose that they were now amply provided for in curative hospitals, and that
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some restless, dissatisfied theorists, not content to leave them in such good care, were, in
violation of all professional and humane ideas, endeavoring to thrust them out and
precipitate them into a hell, over the gateway to which shall be inscribed, “All hope
abandon, you who enter here.” (Cook 1866, 52)
Rather, Cook (1866) explained that the proposed custodial asylum would specialize in the
distinct needs of the chronic insane, saving them from the degradation of the county poor houses
where Gray and others apparently had been satisfied to let them remain. Facilities for the curable
and incurable insane have “two distinct ends to be attained, requiring different construction,
organization and management” (58). The “commingling” of the two groups would inevitably
cause the institutional administration to “sacrifice the highest good of one class to the other.
Need I add that the sacrifice falls mainly upon the chronic class?” (58).
Although the national debate had largely been settled by the end of the 1870s (Grob
1973) in favor of large congregate facilities, New York had taken a different path. The Willard
State Asylum for the Chronic Insane was opened in 1869 (a similar facility was opened in
Binghamton in 1879). By 1875 the institutional population of Willard had exceeded one
thousand inmates (Grob 1973, 387). During this time, perhaps the most detailed defense of the
separate custodial facility was provided by Hervey B. Wilbur. Wilbur, the superintendent at the
Syracuse Idiot Asylum (later named the “Syracuse State School”) was commissioned by the New
York Board of Charities to do a report on insane asylums in Great Britain, which he presented to
the Board in 1876. The report was generous in its praise of institutions in Scotland, England, and
the community plan used in Gheel, Belgium. In essence, Wilbur’s argument for separate
custodial facilities had three points: First, creating separate, single purpose asylums would allow
each individual facility to stay relatively small in size, thus allowing more personalized
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supervision; second, without the burden of aggressive medical intervention in pursuit of a cure,
superintendents of custodial asylums could more easily embrace the British practice of
nonrestraint as advocated by Connolly and others; and finally, a focus on custody rather than
cure allowed institutions to use inmates in workshop and gardening occupations that were both
financially helpful to the institution and behaviorally instructive to the inmates themselves.
Not only was Wilbur generous in his praise of the British asylums that he visited. His
report was also generous and specific in its criticism of Gray and the Utica asylum (Wilbur
1876). After describing at some length, the economic and therapeutic benefits to be found in the
small custodial insane asylums of Scotland, where inmates were given vocational responsibilities
as part of their care, Wilbur turned to Gray’s opposition to specialized custodial asylums in the
United States:
It may be said, and with truth, that it is a predominance of chronic cases that permits this
large percentage of employment [of able-bodied inmates] in British asylums, but this
same fact is true in American asylums generally. The theory is, not that our institutions
have a greater proportion of recent [i.e. potentially curable] cases and, therefore,
employment is impracticable, but it is a general want of faith in employment, as a means
of treatment, in any form of insanity. (Wilbur 1876, 186)
Wilbur quotes Gray’s dismissal of the Scottish model for use in America and then gives his
unvarnished opinion of his fellow superintendent’s argument: “This is the language of one who
knows nothing, by observation, of the actual facts of the case” (187).
Despite Wilbur’s report and the backing of the New York State Board of Charities and
Corrections, even the custodial institutions in New York would gradually yield to the national
trend for congregate care of the insane. By 1890, the New York legislature had passed the “State
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Care Act.” While one major feature of the act was to clearly centralize the care of the insane
poor as a state responsibility, the other feature was to undo the policy of separate custodial
facilities begun in 1865. Indeed, the act mandated the “abolition of the legal distinction between
cases of acute and chronic mental disease” (Schneider and Deutsch 1941, 97). What had been
custodial facilities in Ovid (Willard) and Binghamton, New York, became congregate care
insane asylums with regional responsibility for all of the insane poor within their geographic
regions.
The debate over custodial versus congregate insane asylums overshadowed the agreement
that both types of facilities would be built along the cottage plan of separate buildings. The back
ward, in short, was a product of the need for a separate place to house the chronically insane.
From the perspective of those with the most significant disabilities, the debate over the two
models of institutions was a distinction without a difference. However, from the perspective of
professional control and influence, the outcome was seen as critical. Perhaps for that reason the
argument would continue in New York State for several more decades. The argument shifted
from asylums for the insane to those for idiots, but the issues were virtually the same as were the
outcomes.

Renewing the Debate: Wilbur, Kerlin, and the “Proper Care” of Custodial
Idiots
As mentioned, Superintendent Gray and the backers of large, congregate asylums for the insane
rather quickly carried the day in terms of institutional policy in most states. Even as Gray
bemoaned the authorization of the Willard Asylum in 1865, he (anonymously but accurately)
claimed that the larger debate over the arrangement of custodial care was already decided:
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There is, perhaps, no subject connected with provision for the insane, upon which the
verdict of the profession has been more unanimous than their condemnation of asylums
for incurables. If, as we have said, the chief source of chronic lunacy is the want of
asylums for cure, it is obvious that we but palliate the evil by establishing institutions for
the so-called incurable. (The Willard Asylum 1865, 207)
Wilbur did not agree with Gray’s assessment and carried on the policy debate. Until his
death in 1883, Wilbur pushed the notion of separate custodial asylums. However, much of his
attention over those decades was focused on his primary area of professional expertise—the idiot
asylum. It was against the backdrop of the debate about custodial insane asylums that the similar
but delayed debate over custodial idiot asylums played out in New York and elsewhere. 8 Again,
it was a debate that Wilbur was to lose, although—as we have seen—there were advocates in
New York for separate custodial idiot asylums well into the twentieth century. Taking Gray’s
place in support of large congregate care facilities, housing all levels of idiots from the most
educable imbecile to the most hopeless idiot, was one of Wilbur’s few peers in terms of
influence among idiot asylum superintendents, Isaac Kerlin of the Elwyn Asylum in
Pennsylvania.
Both Wilbur and Kerlin were among the first generation of idiot asylum administrators.
Unlike others of that generation(e.g., Samuel Gridley Howe and Edward Seguin), Wilbur and
Kerlin were active participants in the move to establish the area of idiot asylum administration as
its own medical and educational specialization, equal to but distinct from the better known field
of insane asylum administration. Wilbur had actually preceded Howe and his “experimental
school” for idiots—by a few months—in starting his private school in Barre, Massachusetts, in
1848 (Graney, 1979). When New York started the country’s second public idiot asylum in 1852,
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Wilbur became its first superintendent. He was to remain in that position until his death more
than 30 years later. For his part, Kerlin gained notice and influence as the superintendent of the
prominent institution opened outside of Philadelphia—the Pennsylvania (Elwyn) Training
School—with both public and private inmates. Following Wilbur’s pattern of longevity, Kerlin
remained as superintendent of the facility for 30 years until his death in 1893. In 1876, both
Kerlin and Wilbur were among the handful of superintendents who helped start the professional
organization that would come to represent their field: the Association of Medical Officers of
American Institutions for Idiots, Imbeciles and Feeble-Minded Persons.

Kerlin and the “Thoroughly Classified Institution”
In a report to his fellow superintendents in 1888, Kerlin laid out many of his reasons for
preferring these larger asylums that housed all levels of idiots at one location, though separated
into different cottages. In such facilities, Kerlin argued, there were economic benefits to the state,
therapeutic benefits to the inmates, and what might today be called professional development
opportunities for the staff.
1.

Better medical care can be arranged for the “epileptic, paralytic, and
scrofulous” children.

2.

Under the expert eye of the superintendent, inmates may be easily moved back
and forth from the “asylum branch” to the “education branch” as progress or
deterioration occurs with specific individuals. Such movement would be much
more difficult if the educational and custodial departments were not “in
proximity.”

3.

Only in congregate institutions could the “custodials” benefit from the
entertainment and cultural events provided by and for the higher functioning
inmates (e.g., institution bands, theatrical productions, “stereopticon”
showings).

16

4.

The agricultural and industrial work of the physically able custodial inmates
would have a “local market” in the institution itself. “[T]he gardening,
laundering, and cobbling of our feeble-minded employés (sic) find here an
exchange which will never be criticized by outside ‘labor unions,’ nor reached
by ‘labor legislation’” (80).

5.

Just as inmates can be shifted around from one level of cottage to another, so
may staff be moved from fairly unskilled work with custodial residents to more
preferred (and better paid) work as matrons or teachers in the educational
department.

6.

Finally, and in an argument that most closely followed the concern expressed
two decades earlier by John Gray, Kerlin maintained that the stigma and
pessimism surrounding the hopeless care of custodial idiots would inevitably
lead to what Gray referred to as an “unhealthy atmosphere” if isolated from
other inmates more amenable to remediation. By contrast, when located within
an ‘all-purpose’ facility, the custodial department is maintained as a “medical
philanthropy” so that it “can never sink to the hopeless, uninviting, and
deplorable condition which attaches to the common thought of an utter and
complete asylum for neglected idiocy” (Kerlin 1888, 80).

Kerlin summarized his defense of the congregate facility:
In short, the experience at Elwyn attests to the economy, reasonableness, and humanity of
embracing under the central administration of a general institution all the grades and
classes of the idiotic and feeble-minded, living in segregate buildings, it is true, but
allowed legitimate contact; each divisible from the other by a classification scientific but
not rigid, yet no one group isolated from the Divine influences of hope and the human
helps to improvement. (Kerlin 1888, 80–81)
At the same time that Kerlin made his case for his “all-comprehensive” institution, he made clear
that the most severely disabled inmates—those who were assigned to the so-called asylum
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department—should be located at the back of such facilities, not the front. Cottages for these
individuals were to be “more remote” and positioned “at some distance from the other
departments—say from one-half to three-quarters of a mile” (Kerlin 1884, 260). For these
facilities, big was better. Not only did size offer economies of scale, it offered a large enough
population with which to demonstrate the diagnostic expertise of the asylum professionals. As
mentioned earlier, taxonomic complexity—finding gradations and categories of idiocy where
none had been found before—became for Kerlin and other leaders a key indication of specialized
knowledge. All of that was possible only with facilities of a certain number and variety of
inmate. As a result of this calculation, the very idea of small, custodial asylums was morally
problematic for Kerlin:
It is the small institution against which may be pronounced the objection of moral
“hospitalism.” The large, diffuse, and thoroughly classified institution is another affair,
and can be to its wards and employés [sic] as cosmopolitan as a city. (Kerlin 1884, 262,
emphasis added)
By the time of Kerlin’s death in 1893, his plan for custodial cottages was fully implemented. The
Elwyn facility had a four building “Hillside” complex matching Kerlin’s policies for type of
resident and distance from the other cottages. It was purely custodial in character. One building,
for example, was designated for “helpless, idiotic and epileptic boys.” Another (called “the
chalet”) was for “epileptic and paralytic girls” (cited in Hurd 1916, 507). Other states were
gradually following the same model.

Wilbur and the Developmental Divide
For Wilbur and others in New York State, the argument for separate facilities for educable and
uneducable feebleminded persons was at once more straightforward and less detailed. The

18

custodial class of inmate was a diversion from the pedagogical purpose of the purely educational
facility (such as the Syracuse Asylum). In language predictive of that used in 1906 by the special
committee of the Board of Charities mentioned earlier, Wilbur stated clearly in his 1871 Annual
Report that “The presence of these [unteachable ones] not only embarrasses the general
management, but swells the average cost of taking care of the pupils generally” (Wilbur 1871,
11). Indeed, for a number of years after the opening of the Willard insane asylum in Ovid,
Wilbur argued that one of the buildings at that facility should be dedicated to receive the
custodial idiots gradually building up in number at Syracuse. The logic was obvious to Wilbur:
“It would seem as if the mere presentation of the facts would suffice to ensure the necessary
legislation” (12). By 1878, Wilbur reports to the other asylum superintendents that he and the
Board of Trustees at Syracuse had always known that some alternative provision for custodial
inmates would eventually have to be made. Keeping them at Syracuse was always thought, “not
[to] be desirable” (Wilbur 1878, 96).
Wilbur’s defense of separate facilities for custodial inmates can also be at least partly
explained by his grudging insistence that his beloved institution at Syracuse was, at its heart, a
school. Schools are for children. This was also a difference between idiocy and insanity, and
therefore perhaps why Wilbur continued to fight for separate custodial idiot asylums even after
the battle over separate insane asylums had been clearly lost. Insanity was seen largely as a
disease of adults, while idiocy was almost always present from childhood. As a result, insane
asylums had few children, while institutions for idiocy had many. Indeed, the earliest idiot
asylums were often called “training schools” and barred admission of adults. 9
The growing presence of adults represented a daily challenge to Wilbur’s original
conception of who he was and what he did. For him the developmental model of
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feeblemindedness was more about physical age than “mental age.” If you were an adult, you did
not belong in a school, even one exclusively designed for feebleminded children. For Wilbur,
there was a clear line of demarcation: if you had not moved far enough along the developmental
scale to function independently or with only moderate supervision in the community, then you
were custodial once you reached adulthood. This also helps explain why Wilbur argued for
several years after the opening of the Willard asylum for the chronically insane, that custodial
idiots could also be housed there. The point was that they were unimprovable adults; the source
of their chronicity was not as important as its undeniable presence 10.
Wilbur’s argument about the educational function of institutions for children with milder
degrees of feeblemindedness highlights one of the important differences between asylums for
idiots and those for the insane. When one reads the classification schemes that were emerging for
the two separate populations, it is noticeable that the focus for classifying the insane was
identification of different types of insanity. With idiocy, on the other hand, the emphasis tended
to be on levels of impairment. Within idiot asylums of the late 1800s, in both Europe and North
America, one sees the use of increasingly elaborate levels of developmental classification
(Simpson 2007). In essence what we see in these schemes is a gradual adoption of a
developmental model as the basic frame within which to understand feeblemindedness in all its
forms. In this frame, the feebleminded person came to be portrayed very differently than the
lunatic. Unlike insanity, feeblemindedness increasingly came to be understood as a premature
interruption of the individual’s gradual development or maturation from child to adult. Certainly
this idea really gained dominance after the turn of the century with the rapid dissemination of the
Binet intelligence test and its popularization of the concept of mental age.
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As in the debate over separate, custodial insane asylums, Wilbur’s position once again
officially carried the day in New York State, while other states followed the advice of Kerlin and
others building or enlarging large, congregate facilities with separate cottages for custodial
inmates. As with the Willard Asylum, however, the official policy toward idiot asylums in New
York steadily gave way to the congregate practice followed elsewhere. Kerlin even tried to
rewrite Wilbur’s endorsement of separate facilities as a misunderstanding that unjustly sullied his
departed friend’s reputation. Speaking specifically of the institution established at Newark, New
York, Kerlin doubted Wilbur’s support:
I think that this whole matter of Dr. Wilbur’s connection with the Newark institution
should not be left in doubt. We do not want to embarrass the name of that good man with
any possible mistake of today. All of us who have visited it and are studying the outcome
of it, agree with Mrs. Kerlin that it is a palpable mistake. My own impression is that Dr.
Wilbur had no intention of permanently separating the girls from the institution at
Syracuse . . . The Newark institution will probably eventually become a general
institution for the care and training of feeble-minded persons, irrespective of age and sex.
(Kerlin 1891, 217)
Kerlin’s prediction proved correct. Indeed, the defense of separate facilities was so discredited
that it was thought that history should be revised so that Wilbur would not be associated with
such a wrongheaded approach. 11

Custodialism and the Creation of the Continuum of Care
What are we to make of this debate and its outcome? The immediate reasons for the triumph of
the congregate care asylum are fairly easy to surmise. First, there were simple economies of
scale to be had by building a smaller number of large facilities rather than a larger number of
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small ones. Indeed, the use of inmate labor to help run the asylums became a source of pride
among superintendents. Walter Fernald of Massachusetts described the use of higher functioning
female inmates to care for “the lowest grade idiots, paralytics [and] the helpless” as a way of
showing the people of Massachusetts that “these trained girls can be of benefit to the state by
caring for their more helpless associates” (Fernald 1891, 215). Kerlin himself bragged about
maintenance costs at Elwyn decreasing from $250 to $100 per person because of the use of
unpaid inmate labor. The male residents, for example, completely managed the institution
bakery, “baking four to six barrels of flour daily at no expense for wages” (Kerlin 1891, 217).
A second reason was the administrative usefulness of having all of the clients at one
setting, available to be moved and shuffled on relatively short notice. As Kerlin noted in listing
his reasons for congregate care, the convenience of having the two populations—educational and
custodial—in close proximity at one institution allowed such reassignments to happen more
often. Of course, this also allowed the administrator a handy explanation for therapeutic failure:
if a resident did not respond to intervention efforts, it was because of misclassification, not poor
instruction. The failure to improve became a “success” of classification by simply moving the
individual to the proper cottage following prolonged observation. Indeed, one senses that
Kerlin’s greatest sense of triumph came with the “thoroughly classified” institution that he was
able to oversee at Elwyn. Elaborate classification of inmates became a powerful demonstration
of professional legitimacy even if some of those classifications involved admission of therapeutic
impotence.
Finally, it can be argued that the rapid adoption of the “cottage plan” itself was as much a
cause as an effect of the move to large congregate care facilities. By moving to a model of
institutional design that emphasized the use of small, separate, simple, cheaply constructed units
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(or cottages), the states could have their custodial cake and eat it too. Instead of building entirely
separate custodial facilities, they were able to build the first back wards—institutions within
institutions.
In the end, then, the only question that remains hard to answer is why Wilbur and his
New York colleagues maintained their contrarian support for separate facilities for so long. A
partial answer seems connected to Wilbur’s own history. Wilbur saw himself as an educator first
rather than an administrator (although he clearly acknowledged that role as well). In his closer
ties to Seguin, he embodied a tradition of intervention and instruction that ran parallel to the
other tradition of custody and control. His success, his claims to special expertise, were much
more closely tied to educational outcomes than to administrative efficiencies. Both for Wilbur
and his successors in New York, custodial inmates were more of an “embarrassment” than an
opportunity.
So the issue of congregate versus separate can be seen not only as a debate over where
inmates of various levels could best be served, but how professional claims to specialized
knowledge could best be secured. A strategy of separate care would allow the superintendent to
have the discretion of demonstrating the power of classification and assessment while focusing
treatment on the salvageable minority. It gave the superintendent dominion over a smaller
population but one with better prospects for valued treatment outcomes. The congregate care
facility gave the superintendent control over the full range of individuals—the power to sort and
serve as he saw fit on a continuing basis—where expertise is demonstrated by administrative
efficiency as much as treatment efficacy (Ferguson 2002).
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Conclusion
In today’s formal support system for individuals with intellectual disabilities, a continuum of
placement model has come to dominate the arrangement of services (Taylor 1988). In terms of
schooling, students are placed somewhere along a continuum of more or less segregated settings
running from the general education classroom on one end to entirely self-contained schools on
the other (Ferguson in press). For vocational services, the continuum runs from supported
employment in integrated work settings to sheltered work shops to segregated “day programs”
where even the pretense of vocational activity is abandoned.
Finally, we have the residential continuum. Although small, community-based
apartments and homes for adults with even significant intellectual disabilities have grown in
number over the last few decades, the other options of the continuum have remained persistently
in place. We still have large 10–20 bed group homes that often resemble nothing so much as the
industrial and farm colonies started as offshoots of institutions more than a century ago. And
finally, we still have the large, public congregate institution. As mentioned earlier, almost thirty
thousand individuals continue to live in such facilities, with thousands more simply shifted to
private versions of the public facilities. Yet, we know from years of practice and volumes of
research that these remaining “back wards”—sanitized and improved as they may be—are not
required to support individuals with disabilities. Eleven states have already demonstrated that by
closing their large facilities (Larson et al. 2013, 7). In every state, there are individuals with the
most significant disabilities being supported in family homes or in small community alternatives.
Why does the continuum of placement continue to preserve its most segregated options?
Of course, there are multiple constituencies who continue to speak on behalf of these
options (including some families and some disabled individuals themselves). Moreover, the
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intentions and preferences of individuals must be interpreted in the context of structural forces
that nurture and shape those personal perspectives. Although financing segregated settings has
become much more costly over the last three decades—as national and state standards of staffing
and support have been established and enforced—the large, congregate care facility is still often
seen as the best economic alternative among the many care options now available.
The historian’s answer to such a policy conundrum might return to the debate from the
nineteenth century. It is the continuing professional usefulness of therapeutic failure as both a
diagnostic category and a location of service that makes today’s back wards so resistant to
change. The system within which professionals find themselves continues to reinforce the use of
a physical location and conceptual justification for those whom professionals seem unable to
help. Failure still needs a home, with or without a back ward attached.
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1

The history of the term “back ward” and its usage as a reference to places where the individuals with the
most “hopeless” conditions were kept would make an interesting study of its own. At least by the
1950s, the term was appearing in the titles of academic papers, with the obvious assumption that
readers would understand the reference. One of the earliest such references (Martin 1950), described
the meaning of the term as follows:
Every mental hospital has one of these wards for the patients who are deteriorated but physically
fit. The public thinks in terms of “The Snake Pit.” The general practitioner thinks of these
patients in such terms as “the hopeless and the damned.” The hospital ward attendant usually
feels that work with these patients lacks result, purpose, and prestige. The mental hospital
doctor is usually preoccupied with his load of “new” patients, and these patients and their
relatives make frequent demands upon his time and attention. (758)

2

By “therapeutic failure” I mean not just the failure of individuals to show improvement while under the
care of professionals but also the “official” explanation of that failure as the result of the hopelessly
unsalvageable nature of the individuals’ disability (Ferguson, 1992). Those individuals who “refused”
to respond to the therapeutic regimen of the institution were now professionally ordained as chronic
and beyond help. The problem was portrayed not as the inadequacy of the treatment but as the
inadequacy of the person. For asylum administrators, the challenge presented by such individuals
became the arrangement and location of their custody rather than continuing futile efforts at
remediation.

3

The terminology used here will often include words or phrases that are no longer used or occur only as
insults. However, during the times under discussion, the terms (e.g., feebleminded, idiotic, imbecilic,
insane) were part of the clinical language of the emerging class of professionals in charge of their care
in institutions.

4

The term “colony” in this institution’s name was also meant to indicate a particular variant of the more
familiar “cottage” model. The term ostensibly refers to the centuries old arrangement in Gheel,
Belgium, where insane people were housed in the homes of towns people in Gheel. In the United
States, a number of asylums in the nineteenth century started “farm colonies” as outposts of the main
facility. These would typically be nearby the asylum, and have a resident family managing the farm
and supervising 20–40 (male) inmates who were moved there. The products of their efforts were then
used by the institution to defray costs. At Craig, the term “colony” was being used in a different sense,
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but still invoking at least an American perception of the Gheel arrangement. As the first Superintendent
of the facility (William Shanahan) described the plan, the Colony was to differ from the cottage plan:
This colony design includes not only the separation of the patients into detached buildings, but
the arrangement of the cottages upon irregular lines and at different distances, in accordance
with the situations of the various building sites, adapted to the self-support of the inmates
through natural advantages for economy of administration, and for the successful prosecution
of trades, industries and agricultural labors. (Shanahan 1912, 155)
In practice, the facility came to resemble most of the other institutions built in this era along the cottage
plan.
5

As Nicole Rafter has ably described in her book Creating Born Criminals (Rafter 1997), the “unlikely
alliance” (p. 41) of Wilbur and Lowell in support of the Newark asylum was a case of dramatically
different perspectives about people with disabilities coalescing around a shared outcome. To
oversimplify the situation, Lowell wanted to protect society from the moral depravity of feebleminded
women, while Wilbur needed a place for the unimproved residents of his facility at Syracuse to move
as they became adults. For both, then, the Newark asylum was a common solution to two different
problems.

6

At its core, the power of the concept of therapeutic failure is that it allows the professional to continue to
claim success in the face of demonstrable ineffectiveness. Indeed, one way to demonstrate one’s
special expertise is to discover distinctions of classification where none had previously existed. So it
was in this case as well: even among the custodial population, identification of the truly custodial
creates a category of therapeutic failure where only generic ineffectiveness had been previously seen.
The ability to diagnose permanent and inescapable failure in others was a demonstration of
professional expertise.

7

Interestingly, Willard’s report of 1865 did find some variation in the quality of care in the poor houses
around the state. Many were, indeed, apparently terrible; however, others such as the facility in
Westchester County were praised as models of humane and therapeutic care. Still, despite these mixed
results, Willard’s strong recommendation was to build a separate state asylum and mandate the
placement of chronic poor insane.

8

This lag time between developments in “treating” the insane and similar developments in “treating”
idiots is remarkably persistent throughout American history. The first public insane asylum (not
counting the facility at Williamsburg) was opened in Worcester, Massachusetts in 1833. That was
followed 15 years later with the opening of the first “experimental school” for idiots by Samuel Gridley
Howe in 1848. The first officially custodial asylum, Willard, was authorized in 1865 (though not
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actually opened until 1869). The custodial idiot asylum at Newark, New York, was opened 13 years
later in 1878. In the twentieth century, the population of insane asylums peaked in 1955, before a
combination of new drugs, old economics, and civil rights concerns began the move to
deinstitutionalize the mentally ill. The peak population for institutions for intellectually disabled
individuals came some 12 years later in 1967. If one wants to make an educated guess at what official
policy toward people with intellectual disabilities will be emphasizing in 10–15 years, there would be
worse approaches than simply noticing what is happening to mental health policy today.
9

In his Annual Report for 1858, Wilbur extracted the relevant clause from the by-laws of the Syracuse
Asylum specific as to who was—and was not—intended for admission:
Children between the ages of seven and fourteen who are idiotic, or so deficient in intelligence as
to be incapable of being educated at any ordinary school, and who are not epileptic, insane or
greatly deformed, may be admitted by the superintendent, with the advice and counsel of the
executive counsel. (Wilbur 1858, 28, emphasis in original<AQ: Please confirm whether the
said text is emphasised in this extract.>)

10

In his Annual Report for 1871, Wilbur mentions the plans for the chronic insane at Ovid (the Willard
Asylum) and says a similar plan should be tried with the unteachable feebleminded. Indeed, he
proposed that the law authorizing the Willard Asylum be changed to allow the admission of custodial
idiots as well as the chronic insane. He had investigated the issue enough to discover that there was an
empty building on the land for the asylum that he proposed to use for this population. “It would seem
as if the mere presentation of the facts would suffice to ensure the necessary legislation” (Wilbur 1871,
12). His presentation of the facts, however, did not suffice and he again reaffirmed his proposal in his
Annual Report for the following year as well (Wilbur 1872). This time, the Board of Trustees endorsed
his proposal for the Syracuse Asylum. It was all to no avail until Wilbur shifted his focus to support of
the Newark Asylum as a separate custodial facility several years later.

11

Wilbur’s worries about the Newark facility were primarily because of its restriction to women, not
because of its custodial character.

30

